INTRODUCTION
s HE funeral industry is subject to a dense patchwork of state and federal regulations that have been justified using plausible but untested theories about funeral market failures. The lack of evidence is astounding given the size of funeral markets-consumers spend over $13 billion per year on funerals-and the changes that have occurred within them, such as the dramatic increase in the cremation rate from less than 4 percent in the mid-1960s to nearly 25 percent in the late l990s.l impose unnecessary costs and restrict consumer choice," a task that only a small handful of states have tackled over the last 25 years.5
In the next section, we discuss some of the salient characteristics of funeral markets and describe two competing views of the way that they operate. In Sections II and III, we describe the state and federal funeral regulations that may influence the choice between cremation and burial and develop some hypotheses about their economic effects. In the last four sections, we develop our empirical model, describe our data, present our empirical results, and discuss our conclusions.
II. THE MARKET FOR FUNERAL SERVICES
Critics of the funeral industry characterize funeral consumers as less informed than consumers in typical markets.6 Since most people have very little experience arranging funerals prior to a death, consumers often have very little knowledge about the variation in the price and quality of funeral services. This information is costly to acquire once a death occurs because consumers often have a limited amount of time and are emotionally unprepared to, or feel that it is disrespectful to, search for a low-cost provider. These characteristics, according to the FTC, "reduce the ability of consumers to make careful, informed purchase decisions."7 The FTC also argues that the entry of new firms is "hindered by a number of obstacles," including state regulations and the difficulty of attracting customers given the lack of consumer information.8 More than anything else, it is the lack of information that the FTC believes "impairs the efficient operation of funeral markets."9
Another view is that the funeral market "does not work at all like the FTC claims it does," because most consumers are better informed than the FTC thinks they are.l° In support of this view, Fred McChesney presents evidence that many people make funeral arrangements prior to a death and that most of the others are assisted by family members and friends, some of whom are very likely to have had prior experience arranging funerals. He does not argue that funeral consumers are perfectly informed, only that they are about 203 STATE FUNERAL REGULATIONS demand are likely to be large because of a decrease in the amount of repeat business and fewer referrals.l7
Using county-level data, we test whether funeral directors induce demand by steering people away from cremation. In order to develop our empirical model, we need to discuss the regulations that may influence the choice between cremation and burial.
III. STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS
The earliest funeral regulations arose at the turn of the century when states began to license funeral homes and funeral directors. All states except Colorado now license funeral directors, and most states regulate the funeral industry in a variety of other ways. The state regulations examined in this paper are (1) licensure requirements for individuals selling funeral services, (2) facility requirements for firms selling funeral services, (3) prohibitions against firms combining cemeteries and mortuaries, and (4) restrictions that require that crematories be located in cemeteries. Table 1 18 These regulations, which emanate from state statutes and from rules promulgated by funeral boards and health departments, were obtained by examining state statutes, surveying regulators in all 50 states, and questioning officers of state funeral and cemetery associations. l9 Some of these states offer separate licenses for funeral directors and embalmers but impose identical educational and apprenticeship requirements, which leads most practitioners to obtain both. In these states, we assume that funeral directors are effectively required to be embalmers. Another layer of regulations was added in 1984 when the FTC implemented the Funeral Rule.27 The first provision of the rule requires that firms give customers an itemized price list containing all of the goods and services that are offered for sale, such as direct cremations. This provision also requires that firms give prices over the phone when someone requests them. The second provision prohibits firms from misrepresenting legal requirements or other rules about funeral goods or services. For example, they may not imply that embalming is always required as a public health measure. The third provision prohibits firms from requiring customers to purchase unnecessary goods and services, such as caskets for bodies that are to be cremated. The fourth provision prohibits firms from charging for goods and services, such as embalming, without prior approval. 22 A direct cremation includes picking up the body from the place of death, transporting it to a crematory, providing a container for cremation, obtaining all the necessary authorizations, carrying out the cremation itself, and returning the remains to the family. 23 
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Critics argue that the real purpose of state funeral regulations is to benefit private interests within the industry, often at the expense of the public interest. According to the critics, funeral directors led the campaign for state licensing of embalmers and funeral homes because they wanted to shed their image as undertakers and be recast as professionals.3l Furthermore, they argue that stringent licensure requirements strategically benefit some members of the funeral industry over others. For example, the principal regulatory body in most states is a funeral board or commission, which typically issues licenses, monitors professional behavior, inspects funeral homes, and adopts rules and regulations for the practice of funeral service providers. A majority of the members are required to be license holders in all but a few states.32 Furthermore, the appointment process has "tended to produce boards that are rather homogeneous in their makeup and strongly oriented toward preserving the status quo."33 This suggests that in states where small, independent funeral homes dominate the industry, the board is likely to defend regulations that favor this type of firm.34
Viewed from the private interest perspective, the embalming regulations that require all funeral service providers to be trained as embalmers and all funeral service firms to have embalming preparation rooms protect small, independent funeral homes from two types of potential competitors: funeral home chains and firms specializing in cremation services. W%ile these requirements raise the cost of providing funeral services for all firms, the increases are likely to be larger for cremation firms, which rarely embalm bodies, and chains, which could otherwise exploit economies from the specialization of labor and from centralized embalming facilities.
However, the alternative public interest explanation also implies that the embalming regulations could reduce the quantity and increase the relative price of cremation services. Without the regulations, cremation firms having few facilities and operated by minimally trained funeral service providers would sell low-quality cremation services to uninformed consumers at very low prices.35 Under this scenario, the embalming regulations would increase both the quality of cremation services and the cost of providing them. Since 
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STATE FUNERAL REGULATIONS many consumers would not perceive the improvement in quality, they might react to the higher price of cremations by choosing cremation less frequently. Therefore, the two views of funeral regulations cannot be distinguished solely by price and quantity effects.
They can, however, be distinguished by their sharply different predictions concerning the effect of embalming regulations on demand inducement. The private interest view suggests that embalming regulations should lead to more demand inducement. For example, requiring all funeral service providers to have similar facilities and training may lead to greater uniformity in their recommendations, making it more difficult for consumers to detect demand inducement. In contrast, the public interest view suggests that regulations should mitigate this behavior by increasing the professionalism of funeral providers. Finding greater demand inducement in more stringently regulated states would imply that these regulations serve private interests within the funeral industry and not the public interest.
B. Prohibitions of Mortuary-Cemetery Combinations
Cemetery owners and funeral directors are often at odds over state funeral regulations, particularly prohibitions against mortuaries being located within cemeteries. For example, cemetery interests have recently launched attacks both legal and legislative on the 60-year-old Wisconsin statute that explicitly prohibits these combinations.36 Calling it "classic fence-me-in legislation designed to protect funeral directors' turf," a lobbyist for the cemetery industry argues that it harms consumers by preventing the "economies of running a combined cemetery and funeral home." A lobbyist for funeral directors disagrees, arguing that it benefits consumers by "minimizing the chances for a single big operator to monopolize a market." Both of these effects are possible; hence, whether the prohibition harms or benefits consumers depends on the net effect on funeral prices of lost economies of scope and reductions in market power.
Under certain conditions, repealing the prohibition against cemeterymortuary combinations would raise the price of cremations relative to traditional funerals. If most of the economies of scope are associated with traditional funerals, allowing combination firms lowers the relative cost of producing them. Furthermore, the broader range of funeral and burial services sold by combination firms may give them an even stronger incentive than stand-alone funeral homes to raise the relative price of cremations. 
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these conditions, prohibiting cemetery-mortuary combinations would lower the relative price of cremations, leading to higher cremation rates.
C. Crematories Must Be Located in Cemeteries
At the turn of the century, cemetery owners and advocates of cremation formed an unlikely alliance that led most early crematories to be located in cemeteries. Cemetery owners thought it would allow them to more easily persuade people choosing cremation to memorialize their dead in "stone," while advocates of cremation hoped it would create greater acceptance of cremation by the public.38 This uniquely American pattern was codified in a few states with regulations that crematories must be located in cemeteries.39 Since modern cremation retorts are very compact and have sophisticated emission controls, there is little reason to require them to be located in cemeteries. Doing so may discourage the sale of cremation services because it increases both the cost of establishing new crematories and the cost of transporting bodies. Cemeteries may also be less likely to promote cremation services than independent crematories because earth burials are more lucrative for them and because they rely on the recommendations of funeral directors, some of whom are hostile to cremation.
V. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The quantity of cremation services sold by a funeral home is assumed to be determined simultaneously with the prices it charges for cremation and burial services, the quantity of burial services it sells, and the number of funeral homes in the market. The corresponding reduced form is a function of the set of factor prices it faces, other variables that affect its costs, and variables that shift demand. Since we have county-level data, we further assume that the reduced form for the total quantity of cremation services in a county is a function of the corresponding county-level variables.40 In this case, the cremation rate for each county is also a function of these same factors under the reasonable assumption that the number of deaths in each county is exogenously determined.
Our simplest empirlcal specification is variables including regional dummy variables and variables describing the demographic characteristics of the county, county factor prices, and changes in the size of county funeral markets; and e is a random error term. All of our regressions are estimated using weighted least squares with weights equal to the number of resident deaths in the county.4l
The estimated coefficients on the funeral regulations will be unbiased only if the funeral regulations are uncorrelated with the error term. There are several ways that such a correlation might arise. First, state funeral regulations might be correlated with unobserved factors that also influence the cremation rate. For example, stronger unobserved preferences for traditional funerals might lead some states to require funeral service providers to have embalming preparation rooms and to be trained as embalmers. Since these states would have lower cremation rates even without the embalming regulations, the regression coefficients would overestimate the impact of these regulations on the cremation rate.
Simply replacing the regional dummy variables with state dummy variables would not solve this problem since the coefficients on the regulations would no longer be identified. However, a specification with state dummy variables can be estimated on samples of counties from states with and without stringent funeral regulations. This specification allows us to exploit the county-level variation in our data in order to investigate the effects of state funeral regulations while at the same time controlling for state-specific fixed effects.
The funeral regulations would also be correlated with the error term if they were simultaneously determined with the cremation rate. Since the "structure and focus" of current state regulations can be traced back to a time when the cremation rate was much less than 1 percent, these regulations were implemented originally for reasons unrelated to the prevalence of cremation.42 However, a few states have changed their regulations over the last 20 years. For example, the number of states that require funeral firms to have embalming preparation rooms decreased from 37 states in 1976 to 33 in 1995.43 If these four states, which include Florida and New Mexico, changed their laws in response to having higher than average cremation rates, then our estimated coefficients would be biased. We control for this potential endogeneity in our tests of demand inducement by replacing the regulations with state fixed effects. 41 We also estimated the model using ordinary least squares as well as semilog and logit specifications, all of which produced very similar results. Our simplest specification includes seven explanatory variables for state funeral regulations. The embalming regulations are summarized using three dummy variables: whether the state (1) only requires funeral firms to have embalming preparation rooms, (2) only requires funeral directors to be embalmers, or (3) requires both. The next variable is the number of years of training required for a funeral director's license. The last three are dummy variables for whether the state (1) offers a direct disposer license, (2) prohibits cemetery-mortuary combinations, and (3) requires crematories to be located in cemeteries.
Since our sample does not include all 50 states, our estimates could be biased if the availability of the cremation data is systematically related to state funeral regulations. A direct relationship is unlikely since the databases were created by state agencies that are primarily concerned with calculating vital statistics on the number and causes of deaths, not with enforcing or evaluating funeral regulations. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the characteristics of funeral regulations for three samples: all states, our sample of states, and states that could not give us cremation rates by county. The states in our sample appear to regulate funeral markets a little less stringently than the omitted states, which tend to be larger and are more likely to be located in the South and Northeast. The small size of most of these differences, however, suggests that it is unlikely that the availability of the cre-44 County cremation rates can be calculated using the county where the person resided, where the person died, or where the cremation occurred. We asked states to give us cremation rates by county of residence because we thought funeral decisions are most frequently made there and because most of our explanatory variables are measured in this way. However, the relevant funeral market may sometimes more closely coincide with the county where the death occurred, leading to measurement error in our dependent variable. This would arise, for example, whenever residents of rural counties die in metropolitan hospitals and have their bodies handled by nearby funeral homes. 45 From a potential sample of 3,099 counties, we lost 822 counties from the 14 statesalifornia, Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia that could not provide us with cremation data. For confidentiality reasons, Colorado, South Dakota, and Georgia would not provide data for 108 counties with less than either four or five cremations. Another 158 counties including all of Alaska's and North Dakota's were lost owing to missing values for particular variables. 
VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis are presented in Table 3 . The first column presents the means and standard deviations, weighted by the number of resident deaths, for the full sample of 2,011 counties for which we have complete data. The mean of the cremation rate tells us that 16.5 percent of the 1.2 million residents of these counties who died in 1990 were cremated.56
The full sample was split into two subsamples: one containing counties from states that had one or both of the embalming regulations and another from states that had neither. The latter states were much less likely to regulate funeral markets in other ways as well. None of them required that crematories be located in cemeteries or that funeral homes and cemeteries be operated independently. They also required 1 less year of training, on average, for funeral directors, and three of these states offered special licenses for direct disposers. Therefore, separating states by whether or not they had embalming regulations captures two distinct approaches to regulating funeral markets: they are either strictly regulated, often in a variety of ways, or relatively unregulated beyond a set of generally less stringent training requirements.
Descriptive statistics for the samples of counties from unregulated and regulated states are presented in the last two columns of Table 3 . Residents of regulated states were much less likely to be cremated (12.1 percent of deaths in 1990) than residents of unregulated states (27.2 percent). This comparison, of course, does not hold other factors constant, such as the higher proportion of Catholics and natives in regulated states. Table 4 presents our regression results that use regional dummy variables to control for any region-specific unobserved differences in tastes or costs that are not already accounted for by our other explanatory variables. The advantage of using regional dummies is that they allow us to produce estimates of the direct effect of state funeral regulations on county cremation rates. Since the regulations are not county specific-varying only by state the t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that have been corrected for the grouped nature of the data.57
The first regression is based on our full sample of 2,011 counties from 34 states. Most of the explanatory variables are statistically significant and have plausible signs. In particular, the results imply that cremation rates are 3.9 percentage points lower in the 14 states that require both funeral directors to be embalmers and funeral homes to have embalming preparation rooms, holding the other explanatory variables constant. Imposing only one of these two requirements also appears to reduce the cremation rate, although only one of these coefficients is statistically significant. The three embalming coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 percent level.58 Using the embalming regulations of all 50 states, we estimate that Amencans spend $252 millionr 2.6 percent more per year on funerals because the embalming regulations induce fewer of them to choose the less expensive option of cremation.59
The estimated coefficient on the number of years of required training for funeral directors implies that each additional year raises the cremation rate by 1.8 percentage points. This is intnguing because it is inconsistent with the common argument made by cntics of the industry that much of this training is focused on ways to sell traditional funerals.60 However, there is a way to explain this result on the basis of changes in relative pnces. Re- 58 We informally tested for endogeneity bias by replacing the 1995 regulations with an index of the stringency of state funeral regulations in 1966. Since cremation was much less common then, this index is almost certainly exogenous to the current cremation rate. Roger Dale Blackwell, Price Levels of Funerals: An Analysis of the Effects of Entry Regulation in a Differentiated Oligopoly 170 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern Univ. 1966), created his index by simply counting the number of regulations in the 30 states that responded to his survey. The estimated coefficient on his index is negative but not statistically significant in our regression, a result that is not surprising given the crude nature of his index and the fact that it is available only for a subsample of our states. 59This increase was estimated by multiplying the sum of the products of the estimated embalming coefficients and the number of deaths in the states with the corresponding regulations by the difference in the average funeral expenditures on burials and cremations. Seventy-four percent of these deaths occurred in states that had both regulations, 21 percent in states that only required funeral homes to have embalming rooms, and 5 percent in states that only required funeral directors to be embalmers. Hence, the estimated increase in funeral expenditures is not being driven by the unusually large coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the state only required funeral directors to be embalmers. Since the other three regulations licenses for direct disposers, prohibitions against cemetery-mortuary combinations, and requirements that crematories be located in cemeteries are found only in either unregulated or regulated states, their impacts are best estimated using the regressions estimated on the subsamples of counties from states with the corresponding regulatory environment. These regressions are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 . While direct disposition licenses do not have a statistically significant effect on cremation rates in unregulated states, this result tells us little or nothing about what effect they would have if regulated states offered them. Prohibiting cemetery-mortuary combinations also has a statistically insignificant effect on the cremation rate in regulated states. One surprising result is that requiring crematories to be located in cemeteries leads to higher cremation rates in regulated states. Finally, the results for the embalming regulations and training requirements for funeral directors mirror the results from the regressions on the full sample. Table 5 presents our regression results for the specification that replaces the regulation and regional dummy variables with a set of state dummy 61 We thank an anonymous referee for this explanation. variables. The advantage of this specification is that it controls for statespecific unobserved differences in tastes or costs and also eliminates any possible bias resulting from the endogeneity of funeral regulations. As a result, it provides us with better estimates of the coefficients on the socioeconomic variables. As expected, people with higher incomes, college graduates, and the elderly are more likely to choose cremation, while natives and people who regularly attend Judeo-Christian churches are less likely to.
If funeral regulations enhance the ability of funeral directors to induce 66 If each coefficient has a 50 percent probability of moving closer to zero, then the probability of nine or more "successes" in 12 Bernoulli trials is .073. The actual probability is much smaller because we are evaluating the changes in terms of statistical significance, which is a much stricter standard of success. 67 We had planned to compare the cremation rates in the regulated counties with the predicted rates under deregulation using the explanatory variables from the regulated counties and our estimated equation for the unregulated sample. However, the estimated fixed effects for the regulated states are found only in the regression for the regulated sample. Assuming that they would have been the same and, hence, cancel out in the comparison of the change in cremation rates from deregulating leads to the problem that separating the effects of intercepts and slope coefficients in this way is entirely arbitrary, and therefore uninterpretable. 
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The estimated coefficients on market growth and the interaction between market growth and whether the market is contracting are both statistically significant in the regression for the regulated sample. While a 1 percent expansion in the size of funeral markets raises the cremation rate by roughly .4 percentage points, an equally large decrease lowers it by 1.1 percentage points. This large reduction in cremation rates is consistent with funeral directors' reacting to income losses from declining death rates by persuading more consumers to choose traditional funerals over less-profitable cremations. In contrast, the estimated coefficients on these variables are statistically insignificant for the unregulated sample. This evidence suggests that changes in the size of funeral markets have little or no impact on the choice of whether bodies are cremated or buried in unregulated markets. Finding a stronger effect of contracting funeral markets in regulated states, where funeral directors have greater market power, supports our interpretation that this effect is due to demand inducement.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study presents evidence that state funeral regulations affect the choice of whether to cremate or bury dead bodies. In particular, state embalming regulations requiring either funeral directors to be embalmers or funeral homes to have embalming preparation rooms-reduce cremation rates by roughly 16 percent. Since burials are more expensive than cremations, the decrease in the cremation rate increases funeral expenditures in these states by roughly 2.6 percent per year, an increase that does not reflect any of the other ways in which embalming regulations may lead to higher funeral expenditures.
We also present evidence that some funeral directors advise consumers against choosing cremation because cremations are less lucrative than traditional funerals. Our evidence that older, higher-income, and less traditional funeral consumers are less likely to choose cremation in regulated states suggests that funeral directors have more influence in these states and are using that influence to induce demand. We also find that cremation rates are lower in regulated states where funeral markets are contracting, which suggests that some funeral directors react to the potential income losses from a declining number of deaths by steering consumers more strenuously away from cremations. Since steering consumers away from cremations is only one of the ways that funeral directors have been accused of inducing demand, our evidence raises the likelihood that funeral directors are inducing demand in other ways as well.
The Funeral Rule attacks demand inducement by carefully prescribing the information that funeral firms must provide to consumers and by prohibiting some specific practices that are thought to be deceptive. However, there may be a better way to attack demand inducement. One of our most intriguing 223 STATE FUNERAL REGULATIONS results is that the relationship between contracting funeral markets and county cremation rates is not only weaker in unregulated states but disappears entirely. This raises the possibility that very little demand inducement occurs in unregulated states, which reinforces our general conclusion that state funeral regulations play a pivotal role in determining the amount of demand inducement. Therefore, repealing state regulations that impede competition may be a better way to attack demand inducement than the approach taken by the Funeral Rule. At the very least, the two policies would complement one another in fostering competition.
